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Chapter 8:
The Twin Environmental Law
Problems of Preemption
and Political Scale
Erin Ryan*
After three years in office, the Trump Administration has dismantled most of the
major climate and environmental policies the president promised to undo. Calling
the rules unnecessary and burdensome to the fossil fuel industry and other businesses, his administration has weakened Obama-era limits on planet-warming
carbon dioxide emissions from power plants and from cars and trucks, and rolled
back many more rules governing clean air, water and toxic chemicals. Several
major reversals [were finalized] as the country has struggled to contain the spread
of the new coronavirus. [This] analysis, based on research from Harvard Law
School, Columbia Law School and other sources, counts more than 60 environmental rules and regulations officially reversed, revoked or otherwise rolled back
under Mr. Trump. An additional 34 rollbacks are still in progress.1

These have been daunting times for the environmental movement in the
United States. Since 2017, it has often seemed that federal environmental
law is being systematically dismantled—most aggressively by the executive
branch,2 but with tacit support from much of the sitting legislature, and—
*

I am grateful to the Environmental Law Collaborative for inviting me to participate in 2018 and
encouraging me to expand these early ideas into the fuller treatment in this chapter. I thank Jonathan
Rosenbloom for his important work on the Sustainable Development Code (SDC) and his helpful
comments on this chapter. I am also thankful to Jill Bowen, Taylor Schock, and Katie Miller for
their worthy research assistance in support of this piece. I especially thank Jill Bowen for her creative
thinking about resolving problems of political scale. I should note that for the purposes of simplifying
my argument, I assume that the objectives of the environmental regulations under fire here are worth
defending in general, while acknowledging that this may not be true in every individual circumstance.
Finally, I note that this piece was written between 2018-20, when environmental law was under more
sustained attack than it may be by the time this book is published.

1.

Nadja Popovich et al., The Trump Administration Is Reversing Nearly 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s
the Full List, N.Y. Times, May 6, 2020.
Id. See also Nadja Popovich et al., 78 Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under Trump, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 28, 2018; Marissa Horn, 26 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back in the Trump Era,
Bloomberg Env’t (July 12, 2018), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-andenergy/26-environmental-rules-being-rolled-back-in-the-trump-era.

2.
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after record numbers of judicial nominees were elevated to the bench during
the Trump Administration—likely with increasing support from the judiciary as well. For environmentalists, the unraveling of regulatory infrastructure built over decades of previous lawmaking has been cause for despair, but
it also compels preparation for the challenges yet to come. Environmental
advocates should especially brace for two federalism-related legal hurdles
likely to frustrate their goals: the twin problems of preemption and political
scale.
Preemption poses a real threat to state and local efforts to combat the rollback of federal environmental law through subnational regulation. Advocates
must ensure that the campaign to dismantle federal law does not spill over
into displacing state and local efforts to fill the void. Nevertheless, there still
remains the problem of matching the large biophysical scale of many environmental problems with available political scale, now more limited than
ever. Advocates must think creatively about how to accomplish the goals of
national-level environmental policy without the benefit of nationwide federal authority. This may require thinking outside the box—but necessity has
always been the mother of creativity, and the need has never been greater.
Written as a memo to environmentalists at this pivotal moment in time,
this chapter reviews the twin federalism-related challenges that flow from
the weakening of federal environmental law. Part I urges advocates to protect
state and local environmental law from anti-regulatory preemption. Part II
suggests new ways of marshaling large-scale responses to looming environmental problems through various means of coordinated local, regional, and
private forms of environmental governance.

I.

Problems of Preemption

The immediate federalism-related challenge is to ensure that the campaign
to alter the fundamentals of federal environmental law is not partnered with
a campaign to block state and local efforts to fill the resulting regulatory
void through preemption.3 Environmentalists should be especially on guard
against the expansion of ceiling preemption, which perverts the customary
use of federal preemption to ensure minimum national environmental qual3.

Although this chapter focuses on federal preemption, it is worth noting that state-law preemption
of municipal actions can be equally problematic and deserves additional scrutiny. See, e.g., Richard
Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 1995 (2018) (noting that “[t]he past
decade has witnessed the emergence and rapid spread of a new and aggressive form of state preemption
of local government action across a wide range of subjects, including . . . environmental and public
health regulation,” and that “[t]he rise of the new preemption is closely linked to the partisan and
ideological polarization between red states and their blue cities”).
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ity standards into maximum standards that restrict regional efforts to do
better. To protect state and local autonomy to exceed minimum standards,
advocates should also seek the inclusion of locally protective savings clauses
in new federal statutes and regulations, and they should prepare to advocate
for the judicial presumption against preemption where these issues are litigated. This section briefly reviews the role of preemption within American
federalism and environmental law before advocating these three strategic
points, illustrating the danger with discussion of current efforts to eliminate
the Clean Air Act’s California Waiver.

A.

Preemption and Environmental Federalism

Within federal environmental law, preemption plays a key role in effectuating the nationwide maintenance of minimum environmental quality standards, especially with regard to state boundary-crossing harms like air and
water pollution. “Preemption” refers to the ability of a higher level of government to override contrary decisions made by a lower level of government. For
the purposes of most federal environmental law, the federal government sets
minimum standards to protect public health or safety, which preempts states’
authority to set lower legal thresholds. Preemption can either be “express,” if
Congress overtly declares that it is preempting state law, or it can be implied,
either because the laws give directly contradictory guidance (“conflict preemption”) or because the higher level of government has unambiguously
occupied the entire field of regulation from interference by lower levels (“field
preemption”).
These rules of engagement are important, because American governance
operates through a multi-tiered system, with interdependent roles played by
local, state, and federal actors in many areas of law. Preemption is especially
important in environmental law, which almost always requires multilevel
regulatory response to be effective. Environmental law copes with problems
that demand local management expertise, such as local geographic and economic factors, while also requiring national jurisdiction to police spillover
harms across state boundaries.4 Within this multilevel system, federal environmental laws have always been essential—but also insufficient. Strong,
centralized guidance provided by federal laws like the Clean Air and Water
4.

See Erin Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, in The Law and Policy of Environmental Federalism: A Comparative Analysis 386-400 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2015) [hereinafter
Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within]; Erin Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism:
Dynamic Federalism as a Strategy for Good Governance, 2017 Wis. L. Rev. 17, 21-26 (2017) [hereinafter
Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism].
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Acts have been essential in setting goals and providing enforcement authority to improve the health of the environment and the American people.5
At the same time, they are insufficient, because the need for locally specific
responses to regionally diverse harms has persisted.6
Effective multilevel environmental governance mixes the advantages of
national and local capacity, mandating national environmental quality standards while enabling local autonomy to meet or exceed them, or to focus
on goals beyond those set by federal law.7 Indeed, programs of cooperative
environmental federalism partner regulators across the jurisdictional spectrum this way, assigning distinct but overlapping roles to federal, state, and
local decisionmakers.8 Multilevel environmental governance requires a careful balance of federal preemption and local autonomy to work well. The best
examples generally match the technical expertise and enforcement authority that only the national government can supply with protected space for
local initiative and innovation that only state and municipal governments
can marshal.9
In the context of environmental governance, then, changing the scope of
preemption can shift the dynamic in important ways. Although some preemption is necessary for national standards to have any force, too much preemption can undercut the multilevel coordination and regulatory dynamism
that is the hallmark of American environmental federalism.10 Which bring
us to the first challenge that environmental advocates will likely face: the
increasing threat of anti-environmental ceiling preemption.

B.

The Threat of Ceiling Preemption

Federal preemption of state and local law enables American federalism to
work as intended, clearing the path for centralized decisionmaking in regulatory realms clearly enumerated to the national government, such as the
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 4, at 405-07 (discussing the federal
role as the “senior partner” in cooperative federalism regimes that privilege federal authority, such as
the CAA).
See, e.g., Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism, supra note 4,at 22-24 (discussing the importance
of local capacity in managing water pollution under the CWA).
See Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 4, at 400-12 (describing different
regulatory approaches taken within cooperative environmental federalism in the United States).
Id.
Id. (describing how cooperative environmental federalism usually assigns federal responsibility for
national goals and oversight while inviting state actors to decide how best to implement these standards
to account for local circumstances).
See Erin Ryan, Secession and Federalism in the United States: Tools for Managing Regional Conflict in a
Pluralist Society, 96 Oregon L. Rev. 123, 149-69 (2017) (analyzing how the United States manages
regional conflict through the dialogic processes of constitutional federalism).
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coining of money or use of military force. Nevertheless, the overuse of preemption in contexts of jurisdictional overlap—where both the federal and
state governments have legitimate regulatory interests or obligations11—can
distort the dynamic multilevel engagement that has enabled American federalism to adapt over time to the roiling dynamics of the regionally and
politically diverse American plurality.12 Especially if preemption is used not
to preserve minimum standards of environmental quality, but maximum
standards.
In the early days of the environmental movement of the 1970s, advocates
pinned their hopes on the big federal environmental statutes poised to remedy the interjurisdictional air, water, and hazardous waste pollution that
states had not been able to tackle in isolation.13 When the first Earth Day
was celebrated half a century ago, environmentalists viewed the preemption
of failing state and local rules by federal environmental law as the only viable
cure for the disease. Yet these new federal environmental laws mostly followed the model of “floor” preemption—setting a national floor of mandatory environmental quality that states could not fall below, but which they
could always choose to exceed.14 By contrast, few of these laws prevented
states from regulating more stringently than the federal standard. Federal
environmental laws have generally permitted state and local governments
to set more ambitious regulatory requirements to address local concerns or
preferences, often using their own preferred methods.15
While federal environmental laws do not usually prevent states from
setting more stringent standards, there are uncommon examples of “ceiling preemption,” by which federal law prevents state and local regulations
from exceeding the federal floor.16 The Clean Air Act’s (CAA) means of
regulating pollution from automobile emissions offers one such example.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has primary authority to
set these standards, and states are generally forbidden from either raising
or lowering them. But even here, there are exceptions. Section 209 of the
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within 105-08, 145-80 (2012) [hereinafter Ryan,
Tug of War]. See generally Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 4.
Ryan, Secession and Federalism in the United States, supra note 11, at 149-69.
See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. §1251; CAA, 42 U.S.C. §7401.
See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction,
82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 1561-64, 1569-75 (noting that ceiling preemption was rare until relatively recently, but has
gained traction in displacing state regulation of environmental and public safety risk tolerance regulation, such as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA), and the siting of Liquefied Natural Gas refineries under the Energy Policy Act
of 2005).
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CAA authorizes California to set a more stringent standard in light of its
unique regional challenges,17 and Section 177 enables other states to elect
California’s stricter standard in lieu of EPA’s “ceiling.”18 The availability of
the California Waiver19 blunts the force of ceiling preemption in the context
of motor vehicle emissions controls, enabling a limited forum for regulatory
dynamism and competition that are a hallmark of American federalism.20
With mounting hostility to environmental regulation, however, the paucity of ceiling preemption could change.21 Even before the new assaults
beginning in 2017, Prof. William Buzbee observed the rise of ceiling preemption, or what he calls “unitary federal choice preemption,” as a mechanism
for reining in more protective state regulatory choices:
Debate over floors versus ceilings was, until recently, largely hypothetical, due
to the rarity of federal imposition of ceilings. During the past year, however,
in settings ranging from product approvals to regulation of risks posed by
chemical plants to possible climate change legislation regarding greenhouse
gases, legislators and regulators have embraced the broad, preemptive impact
of unitary federal choice preemption. The federal action regarding such risks
would be the final regulatory choice. But under what theory of regulation and
legislation can one be confident that placing all decisionmaking power in one
institution at one time will lead to appropriate standard setting?22

Buzbee and other risk regulation advocates warn about the pervasive risks
associated with ceiling preemption. While floor preemption often enables
helpful regulatory competition between state and federal rulemaking, ceiling preemption risks regulatory failures associated with federal legislative or
executive inertia, regulatory uncertainty, information asymmetry, agency
capture, and other problems.23 Buzbee notes that unitary federal choice preemption can create hazards for good governance, heightening the risk that
17.
18.
19.
20.

21.

22.
23.

42 U.S.C. §7543.
Id. §7507.
Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, www.transportation/vehicle-emissionscalifornia-waivers-and-authorizations (last visited May 14, 2019).
Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097 (2009) (describing the iterative federalism mechanics of the CAA and the California Waiver); Erin Ryan, Negotiating
Federalism, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 66-67 (2011) (discussing the implicit state-federal bargaining that takes
place under the CAA through the California Waiver); Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 11, at 308-10.
The regulatory competition associated with the California Waiver is further explained infra at text
accompanying notes 28-34.
Cf. Briffault, supra note 3. Prof. Richard Briffault notes that the trend of punitive, unitary state choice
preemption of local law (roughly analogous to federal ceiling preemption) is closely linked to partisan
contest between “red states and their blue cities”—a partisan conflict roughly analogous to that playing
out between the deregulation interests directing federal policy and the state and local environmental
regulations vulnerable to federal ceiling preemption).
Buzbee, supra note 14, at 1548 (abstract).
Id. at 1590-92.
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unchallenged federal standard-setting will result in poor or outdated regulatory choices.24
These concerns bring us squarely to the crisis facing today’s environmental
advocates. Ceiling preemption has been rare in environmental law until now,
but under the current push to rollback federal environmental standards, that
could change. Using federal authority to block states and municipalities from
protecting environmental values beyond those stated in federal law departs
from tradition, but it may be the best option for those who wish to dismantle
not only federal environmental law but environmental protection more generally. They need ceiling preemption to overcome the “regulatory backstop”
feature of federalism, deriving from its elaborate system of checks and balances, which otherwise empowers both local and national actors to regulate
in realms of jurisdictional overlap.25
The architects of environmental deregulation have already succeeded in
rolling back important federal standards,26 but thanks to our dynamic model
of environmental federalism, they know that defusing federal standards
alone will not be enough to accomplish their goal. State and local leaders are
already hard at work resuscitating the very environmental governance initiatives that the federal government has abandoned. To take one high-profile
example, the U.S. Climate Alliance is a coalition of 25 states and territories
committed to upholding the objectives of the 2015 Paris Agreement within
their borders, and it was formed the very day President Trump withdrew the
United States from the accord.27 Absent preemption, nothing prevents state
and local authorities from doing so.
For deregulation to fully succeed, then, its proponents must also keep state
and local governments from taking up the vacated federal seat at the regulatory table. For that reason, they are unlikely to simply withdraw the federal
government from the regulatory field entirely, which would swing open the
door to state lawmaking. Instead, they will likely seek to partner weaker federal regulations with language that expressly preempts more protective state
24.
25.

26.
27.

Id.
Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 11, at 42-43; Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within,
supra note 4, at 364-65:
Federalism promotes a balanced system of checks on sovereign authority at both the state
and federal level, enabling the useful tool of governance that I have previously called “regulatory backstop,” which protects individuals against government excess or abdication by either
side. When sovereign authority at one level fails to protect the vulnerable, regulatory backstop ensures that it remains available to do so at a different level.
See sources cited supra notes 1-2.
U.S. Climate Alliance, https://www.usclimatealliance.org (last visited May 14, 2019). See also
Hiroko Tabuchi & Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States, and Companies Commit to
Paris Accord, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2017.
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or local rules—in other words, ceiling preemption. And if they cannot muster the political capital to get express preemptive language into the text of a
federal rule or statute, then they will probably attempt to persuade a reviewing court to find that federal law preempts the field entirely, or that contrary
state or local regulation poses an obstacle to the goals of the federal rule.

1.

The California Waiver

As a pertinent example, one of the Trump Administration’s first and most
notoriously anti-environmental moves was to not only weaken EPA’s motor
vehicle emissions standards under the CAA, but also to remove the California Waiver that enabled states to exceed them.28 The Administration had
long wanted to roll back an Obama-era rule increasing emission standards to
54 miles per gallon (mpg) by 2025,29 but rolling back the California Waiver
was the necessary next step—or states could simply ignore EPA’s looser rules
and follow California’s more stringent alternative. That is why the same proposed rule rolling back the 54-mpg standard also eliminates California’s ability to keep it, or otherwise tighten emission standards beyond the relaxed
federal rule. As this book goes to press, the move is being challenged by a
phalanx of state, municipal, and environmental plaintiffs in two separate federal lawsuits before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.30 But if it
survives, it will be a breathtaking expansion of federal preemption—in this
case, by removing the historic handcuffs Congress had purposefully placed
on the only major example of ceiling preemption in federal environmental
law to date.
Losing the California Waiver would portend an enormous shift in the way
the CAA has worked since the earliest days of national emissions controls,
eliminating one of the most effective examples of dynamic cooperative federalism. As Professor Ann Carlson has shown, the California Waiver enables
regulatory competition between state and federal regulators that has enabled
a standard-setting dialogue to unfold over time.31 Congress acceded to automakers’ request for national preemption of up to 50 state standards, but as
28.
29.

30.
31.

Robinson Meyer, The Coming Clean Air War Between Trump and California, The Atlantic, Mar. 6,
2017.
See Coral Davenport, U.S. to Announce Rollback of Auto Pollution Rules, a Key Effort to Fight
Climate Change, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 2020 (discussing publication of a final rule expected to
take effect spring 2020); Timothy Cama & Miranda Green, Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama
Emission Standards, The Hill (Aug. 2, 2018, 8:38 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/energyenvironment/400036-trump-submits-rule-to-weaken-iconic-obama-car-efficiency-standards.
Union of Concerned Scientists v. National Hwy. Traffic Safety Admin., No. 19-1230 (D.D.C Oct.
28, 2019); California v. Chao, No. 19-cv-2826 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2020).
Carlson, supra note 20.
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noted, it moderated this rare example of ceiling preemption with an escape
hatch authorizing California to set stricter standards32—and other states to
choose between the two.33 This created a limited forum for regulatory competition, which allowed the more efficient percolation of new scientific data,
manufacturing capabilities, and consumer preferences into an overall regulatory trend toward tighter controls. As states shifted from EPA’s weaker standards to California’s, EPA was forced to adjust in ways it would not have had
it maintained a full ceiling preemptive regulatory monopoly.34
It is critical that environmentalists preserve the ability of states to continue
pushing us forward on emissions controls and other environmental protections, even as the federal government attempts to take us backward. With
all of this in mind, environmental advocates must identify and fortify the
realms of federal environmental law most vulnerable to ceiling preemption
after federal regulations are weakened. Their best bet, of course, is to marshal conventional political power at the ballot box to elect representatives
that will oppose the weakening of federal environmental law to begin with.
But if that fails, they should diligently oppose any federal moves to displace
protective state and local regulation, ensuring that neither Congress nor EPA
partner federal deregulatory efforts with language that could be read to either
expressly or implicitly preempt subnational interference.

C.

Savings Clauses and the Presumption Against Preemption

At a minimum, environmental advocates and their representatives should
insist that all potentially harmful changes or new federal statutes and regulations include a savings clause clearly and unambiguously stating that the
new rules are not intended to displace valid state or local laws.35 This effort
should not be too far a reach, as the most famous examples of strong federal
environmental laws already incorporate such clauses. Both the Clean Water
Act (CWA) and the CAA include savings clauses clarifying that the statutes
do not preempt parallel state regulation or common-law legal remedies.36 For
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

California was granted the waiver to regulate more stringently because it had already pioneered the
emissions controls EPA adopted nationally, and it faced more serious air pollution problems than
most of the country. Id.
Id.
See sources cited supra note 20.
20A Md. L. Encyclopedia Statutes §62 (March 2019)
See 33 U.S.C. §1370, quoted infra note 37; 42 U.S.C. §7416:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1857c-10(c), (e), and (f ) (as in effect before August
7, 1977), 7543, 7545(c)(4), and 7573 of this title (preempting certain State regulation of
moving sources) nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State or
political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting
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example, the CWA includes a clause specifying that its regulations create a
regime of floor preemption, rather than ceiling preemption, allowing stricter
state or local regulation.37 The CAA further clarifies that the regulations and
remedies it offers are not intended to preempt related causes of action based
on state law brought in state court or by state officials.38
Savings clauses like these have real meaning in court, as demonstrated
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s 2013 decision in Bell v.
Cheswick Generation Station.39 There, the court rejected a coal-fired power
plant’s argument that the plaintiffs’ tort claims, based on the deposition of
ash and other contaminants from the plant onto their neighboring properties, were preempted by the CAA’s comprehensive regulatory scheme governing air emissions from power plants.40 The Third Circuit’s analysis hinged on
the fact that the CAA included a savings clause protecting “the right of any
State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants” and the rights of all persons to
seek common law redress for related harms.41 Two years later, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit similarly concluded that the CAA did not
preempt neighbors’ state-law claims against ethanol emissions by a whiskey
factory, thanks to the clear language of the CAA’s savings clauses.42

37.

38.

39.
40.
41.
42.

emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of air
pollution; except that [states may not adopt standards less stringent than those set forth in
section 7411 or section 7412 of this title].
33 U.S.C. §1370:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or
deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt
or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any
requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution [except those less stringent than
the regulations set forth in this chapter]; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner
affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States.
42 U.S.C. §7604(e):
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may
have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or
limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State
agency). Nothing in this section or in any other law of the United States shall be construed
to prohibit, exclude, or restrict any State, local, or interstate authority from (1) bringing any
enforcement action or obtaining any judicial remedy or sanction in any State or local court,
or (2) bringing any administrative enforcement action or obtaining any administrative remedy or sanction in any State or local administrative agency, department, or instrumentality,
against the United States, any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any officer,
agent, or employee thereof under State or local law respecting control and abatement of air
pollution.
734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 196-97.
Id. at 195 (internal parentheses omitted).
Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2015).
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Even without an explicit savings clause, advocates litigating against preemption can point to the “presumption against preemption” canon of interpretation that has long been recognized by federal courts. As early as the
1947 case of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,43 the U.S. Supreme Court stated
its “presumption against preemption” in the context of federal and state jurisdictional overlap, holding that traditional state sovereignty should remain
in effect over subjects of shared jurisdiction between federal and state law
unless: (1) Congress had unambiguously expressed its intent to preempt the
state law in that context: (2) Congress implied its intent through a federal
scheme that saturates the entire field; or (3) if state law directly conflicted
with the federal law.44 In the 1996 case of Medtronic v. Lohr,45 the Court
affirmed this presumption in fields where states have traditionally regulated
unless there has been a finding of clear congressional intent to preempt.46
The Court has further clarified that this presumption also applies against the
casual displacement of local regulations and ordinances.47
Yet preserving space for subnational environmental regulation is only half
of the federalism-related problem with which environmental advocates will
wrestle in the coming years. They will also need to think about how to get
even bigger things done with much smaller tools.

II.

Problems of Political Scale

With the diminishing force of federal environmental law, it becomes incumbent on environmental advocates to think more seriously about how to continue pursuing solutions to national-level environmental problems by means
other than federal authority. This will doubtlessly be painful for those who
championed the strong federal environmental laws that once helped make
urban air breathable and our lakes and rivers drinkable—and whose successes have made us complacently vulnerable to today’s backlash. Yet now
more than ever, we are facing interjurisdictional challenges that cannot be
managed effectively in a piecemeal manner.48
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Id.
518 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996).
In Medtronic, the Court ruled that the preemption provisions of the 1976 Medical Device Amendments (MDA), which prevented states from establishing any device safety or effectiveness requirement
that is different from those of the MDA, did not preempt state tort law claims of negligent design or
manufacturing, nor failure to warn claims. Id. at 487-91.
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605-06 (1991).
See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional
Gray Area, 66 Md. L. Rev. 503 (2007).
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This part assesses the possibilities for coordinated action beyond federal
law to address large-scale environmental problems. It considers uniform
regional governance using model rules, such as the Sustainable Development Model Code, and even collective private governance, coordinated by
nongovernmental agents such as homeowner associations and professional
organizations. In many cases, these options provide a second-best strategy,
chosen by necessity when first-best options are unavailable. Nevertheless,
they are better than no strategy, and in some cases, may new provide tools
for environmental engagement that could complement or even exceed what
is possible under federal law alone.

A.

Uniform Regional Governance

Some 50 years ago, we conceded that problems like air and water pollution,
species loss, and climate change went beyond any single state’s boundaries
and regulatory capacity. After the failure of the patchwork-of-states approach,
iconic federal laws like the CAA and the CWA recognized the importance
of centralized national authority to cope with these problems.49 But—to ask
the question haunting so many environmental advocates—what if national
authority ends? Less dramatically, what if it goes dormant for an undetermined period of time? Disheartening as it may be, advocates need to think
about new strategies for large-scale environmental governance that don’t rely
on federal law. They should certainly keep fighting to get federal environmental law back—but in the meanwhile, the environment cannot wait.
The clearest alternative is regional governance. Of course, that approach
has significant drawbacks; the regulatory patchwork rejected in the 1970s
had proved ineffective at managing environmental spillover harms, and it
was challenging for industry to follow multiple sets of rules generated by
different states. The failure of regional environmental governance in the past
casts a long shadow over its potential for success in the future, but what if
we do things differently this time? Instead of a patchwork of multiple sets of
rules generated by different states, what if these different states adopted the
same basic rules?
Multi-state adoption of similar rules would ease the burden on industry,
and the more individual states adopt them, the more effectively they could
prevent spillover harms from undermining the overall system. Marshaling
that degree of coordination among the states is no small feat, but there are
precedents—such as the development of uniform state laws or model codes.
49.

John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1183, 1191 (1995).
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Advocates should explore the possibility of drafting proposed uniform laws
or model rules to allow states to address broad environmental problems like
climate change, water pollution, and transportation issues on a broader regulatory scale than they can accomplish individually.
Successful examples like the Uniform Commercial Code,50 the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct,51 and other widely adopted laws provide a
deliberated, tested model for states seeking sound, consensus-based policies
in complex realms of law. States could also form interstate compacts to manage regional environmental issues at the regional level, as many already do
in managing cross-boundary problems like water allocation and waste management.52 State actors could collaborate through the various professional
associations that already enable coordinated state and municipal activity,
such as the National Governors Association,53 the National Conference of
State Legislatures,54 the U.S. Conference of Mayors,55 and the Environmental Council of the States.56
Working together, states could adopt single-issue model rules or interstate compacts, perhaps responding to a specific withdrawal of federal environmental law, such as the rules overturned by the Trump Administration
that required oil and gas companies to report methane leaks,57 limited toxic
emissions from industrial facilities,58 or prohibited hydrofluorocarbons
as replacements for ozone-depleting compounds.59 Alternatively, states or
50.
51.
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See generally U.C.C., §1 et seq. (American Law Institute and Unified Law Commission 1977, last
amended 2012).
Model Rules of Prof ’l Conduct (American Bar Association 1983).
See generally Global Legal Research Center, Interstate Compacts in the United States, The Law Library
of Congress (June 2018), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/interstate-compacts/us-interstate-compacts.
pdf (describing the mechanics and varieties of interstate compacts, including water compacts). See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2021d (authorizing regional compacts for disposal of low-level radioactive waste).
Current Governors, National Governors Association, https://www.nga.org/governors/ (last visited
May 14, 2019).
About Us, National Conference of State Legislatures, www.ncsl.org/aboutus.aspx (last visited
May 24, 2019).
Homepage, The United States Conference of Mayors, https://www.usmayors.org/ (last visited
May 14, 2019).
Homepage, The Environmental Council of the States, https://www.ecos.org/ (last visited May
14, 2019).
Amena H, Saiyid, More Time, Fewer Fines for Oil Companies That Fix Emissions Leaks, Bloomberg
Env’t (May 4, 2018, 5:39 PM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/
more-time-fewer-fines-for-oil-companies-that-fix-emissions-leaks-1.
Sara Merken, EPA Drops Toxic Pollutant Policy It Called Burden to Business, Bloomberg Env’t (Jan.
25, 2018, 6:55 PM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/epa-dropstoxic-pollutant-policy-it-called-burden-to-business-corrected-2.
Abby Smith, EPA Won’t Enforce Obama-Era Coolant Limits, Seeks Rewrite, Bloomberg Env’t (Apr.
17, 2019, 4:21 PM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/epa-wontenforce-obama-era-coolant-limits-seeks-rewrite.
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municipalities could adopt a model code setting forth a universal suite of
sustainability best practices.

1.

A Model Sustainability Code

While an interstate compact would be the more ambitious approach, the
foundations for a model sustainability code are already coming into view. In
2019, an interdisciplinary partnership between universities and practitioners
from across the country produced the first Sustainable Development Code
(SDC), providing a rigorously researched set of concrete models that can
be incorporated into state and local planning efforts.60 Launched in May
2019, the SDC “aims to help all local governments, regardless of size and
budget, build more resilient, environmentally conscious, economically secure
and socially equitable communities.”61 This section introduces the SDC and
invites a thought-experiment on the scope of change it could help accomplish.
The SDC is composed of 32 subchapters targeting specific sustainability
objectives, each of which provides proposed measures, amendments, examples currently in use by model cities, and other informational resources to
help communities adopt and amend their development codes for sustainability and adaptation.62 As the code explains its own structure:
Each of the recommendations . . . has a brief designed by and for public
officials, staff, experts and the public. The briefs consist of three key sections:
introduction, effects, and examples. The introduction explains the recommendation to amend the code. The effects section explains how adopting the recommended ordinance may affect the community and code. Each brief then
provides 2-3 examples of local governments, which have adopted the recommendation. The SDC explains each example in plain language. In addition,
the SDC concludes with an additional 3-6 examples of local governments,
which have adopted the recommendation. Here, the SDC provides citations,
links, and one sentence describing the ordinance.63
60.

61.
62.

63.

About, Sustainable Development Code, http:// sustainablecitycode.org/about/ (last visited May 14,
2019) (describing the mission and methodology of the proposed sustainability code). The effort was led by
environmental law professors at Drake Law School. Drake Law School Forms Partnership to Update Sustainable
Community Development Code, Drake U. Newsroom (Feb. 1, 2017), https://news.drake.edu/2017/02/01/
drake-law-school-forms-partnership-to-update-sustainable-community-development-code/.
About, Sustainable Development Code, http://sustainablecitycode.org/about/ (last visited May
14, 2019).
Id. (noting that recommendations are categorized as
“removing obstacles” (what in the existing code is harming your community), “create incentives” (where can we look to encourage developer, homeowner, and others’ actions), and “fill
regulatory gaps” (what are the minimum standards your community will accept).
Id.
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The SDC thus provides local governments with tools to “think globally
while acting locally,” or to begin implementing uniform sustainable goals on
an individualized basis, as part of a loosely coordinated larger scale effort.64 It
partners proposed elements that seem attainable for most communities, such
as recycling programs, with more aspirational elements that may take more
time to actualize, such as transit-oriented development. Some of the elements
most likely to hold universal appeal, such as proposals for managing solid
waste, facilitating water conservation, or increasing energy efficiency, may
be good starting points around which environmental advocates might begin
building state-level uniform laws. They could then lobby their individual
legislatures to adopt the proposed model as a matter of state planning law,
providing guidance, resources, and requirements for municipalities to implement at the local level.
For example, the SDC Solid Waste Management and Recycling subchapter suggests measures for permitting local recycling centers; recycling
and reusing construction materials; and increasing recycling in multi-family housing and commercial buildings.65 Improving local recycling systems
offers obvious environmental benefits to local communities, many of which
already have robust recycling programs and plans for increasing local recycling capacity.66 Helping communities improve local recycling programs is
low-hanging fruit that can help solve a variety of environmental ills, by repurposing items that would otherwise become landfilled, reducing greenhouse
gas emissions by vehicles transporting recycling elsewhere, and encouraging
sustainable practices locally through role modeling, increased convenience,
and improved efficiency.67
64.

65.
66.

67.

Many code elements are already being adopted piecemeal by local governments across the country,
and many of these are listed in the SDC website. For example, under the subchapter proposing water
conservation landscaping measures, the website reports that Sanibel, Florida, requires 75% of vegetation
be native when land is developed or redeveloped in certain zones, and Scottsdale, Arizona, requires a
permit before removing any native plant. Alec LeSher, Require Water Efficient Landscaping, Sustainable Development Code, http://sustainablecitycode.org/brief/require-water-efficient-landscaping-2/
(last visited May 14, 2019).
Solid Waste Management and Recycling, Sustainable Development Code, http://sustainablecitycode.
org/chapter/chapter-1/1-6/ (last visited May 14, 2019).
For example, Fresno, California permits recycling facilities as a primary use in some zoning code
areas. Fresno, Cal., Code of Ordinances §15-2750(C)(1)-(2) (2017). Madison, Wisconsin created a specific use category for recycling centers in its general plan. Madison, Wis., Zoning Code
tbl. 28F-1 (2017). Reaping the environmental benefits of recycling demands more work from U.S.
communities now that many processing plants in Asia have restricted imports of foreign waste, but
Americans can still invest in the benefits of recycling and reuse by more local means.
Adam S. Weinberg et al., Urban Recycling and the Search for Sustainable Community
Development 21-22 (2000). Collecting and processing waste is an especially energy-intensive project,
so local governments can also cumulatively reduce national emissions by facilitating recycling and
composting and setting waste diversion and reduction goals. Energy Star Delivers Big for America:
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Yet imagine the cumulative beneficial impacts if these efforts were scaled
up to a regional or even national scale. If a modest city of 150,000 nonrecycling households were to follow even some of the code’s recommendations—marketing the program to residents, providing household recycling
bins, and encouraging a 50% participation rate—that one city could annually prevent over 5,000 tons of trash from entering a landfill and over 12,000
metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) from entering the atmosphere through
transport.68 Now imagine scaling those numbers up to regional or national
levels. Eighty percent of America’s 127 million households live in cities,69 so
even if we imagine that only 50% of those 101.6 million households recycle,
it would still mean that those 50.8 million households would save nearly 2
million tons of trash and over 4 million metric tons of greenhouse gas emissions. That’s similar to the annual emissions from 850,000 cars, or 420,000
homes,70 which will not forestall the worst effects of climate change on its
own—but it is a whole lot more than nothing, and from activity as modest
as separating cans, paper, and plastic. Imagine—what if all those households
also focused more directly on conserving energy?
Indeed, the SDC provides ambitious direction for energy conservation
measures. The Energy Conservation and Efficiency subchapter includes proposed measures for providing tax exemptions for renewable energy systems,
increasing tree cover, tracking and requiring reductions in commercial energy
usage, and encouraging third-party certifications in commercial buildings, such as Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED).71
68.

69.

70.

71.

$34 Billion in Annual Consumer and Business Savings, National Resource Defense Council (Mar.
2018), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/energy-star-delivers-big-fs.pdf.
These estimates were gathered using the interactive calculator at The Recycling Partnership,
https://recyclingpartnership.org/greenhouse-gas-water-savings-tool/ (last visited May 14, 2019). The
interactive calculator estimates the tonnage of recyclables and related greenhouse gas savings based
on the EPA Waste Reduction (WARM) model, as adjusted for traditional residential recyclables. For
a community of 150,000 households using conventional curbside bins, assuming 50% participation
and public education campaigns about contamination, the calculator estimates savings of 5,569 tons
of landfill trash and 12,196 metric tons of CO2 emissions.
The U.S. Census Bureau currently estimates the total number of U.S. households at 125,586,000.
U.S. Census Bureau, Table H1. Households by Type and Tenure of Householder for Selected Characteristics: 2018, America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2018, https://www.census.gov/data/
tables/2018/demo/families/cps-2018.html. See also Christopher Ingraham, Americans Say There’s
Not Much Appeal to Big-City Living. Why Do So Many of Us Live There?, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 2018
(“Roughly 80 percent of Americans live in urban areas, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.”).
What Does One Ton of CO2 Really Mean? Assn. for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher
Education (Sept. 18, 2009), https://www.aashe.org/one-ton-co2-really-mean/:
So, just how much is 4.6 million metric tons of CO2? According to the EPA, that’s the same
as the annual energy use of 422,542 homes. It’s the same as the annual ghg emissions of
850,501 passenger vehicles. It’s also the amount of carbon sequestered annually by 32,390
acres of forest preserved from deforestation (epa.gov).
Energy Conservation and Efficiency, Sustainable Development Code, http://sustainablecitycode.
org/chapter/chapter-7/7-5/ (last visited May 14, 2019).
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To harvest low-hanging conservation fruit at the household level, the SDC
recommends incentivizing consumers to replace old appliances with more
energy-efficient models approved by the Energy Star program, a voluntary
labeling program by which EPA helps consumers make informed purchasing choices.72 Since the program’s inception in 1995, it is estimated to have
helped households save over 27 million metric tons of CO2,73 or the annual
GHG emissions of nearly 6 million cars. Again, that will not halt global
warming by itself, or even come close to the 3 billion metric tons of reduced
emissions that the Obama Administration’s U.S. Department of Energy had
promised through issuing new federal energy conservation standards.74 But
those 27 million metric tons were saved just by consumers voluntarily choosing energy efficient appliances at the store. Imagine—what if all those consumers also lived in energy efficient LEED buildings?
In fact, 70% of the electrical load in the United States is used in buildings, mostly to heat and cool them, and buildings account for nearly 40% of
all greenhouse gas emissions nationally, more than either the transportation
sector or the industrial sector.75 The Department of Energy has found that
LEED buildings use 25% less energy than average buildings,76 so encouraging energy-efficient buildings is an important element of the SDC. It points
to innovative models in use across the country, such as Miami Beach, Florida, which charges a hefty development fee of up to 5% of construction costs
for certain new projects, but then refunds portions of the fee on a scaled basis
tracking the level of LEED certification achieved.77 Imagine if all major cit72.
73.
74.

75.

76.
77.

Energy Star Delivers Big for America: $34 Billion in Annual Consumer and Business Savings, National
Resource Defense Council (Mar. 2018), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/energy-stardelivers-big-fs.pdf.
Id.
Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: U.S. Reports Its 2025 Emissions Target to the UNFCCC—
State Department Submits President Obama’s Ambitious 2025 Target to Cut U.S. Climate Pollution by
26-28 Percent From 2005 Levels, The White House (Mar. 31, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/31/fact-sheet-us-reports-its-2025-emissions-target-unfccc (“The
Department of Energy set a goal of reducing carbon pollution by 3 billion metric tons cumulatively
by 2030 through energy conservation standards issued during this Administration.”).
Buildings and Climate Change, U.S. Green Building Council, https://www.eesi.org/files/climate.
pdf (last visited May 14, 2019):
The commercial and residential building sector accounts for 39% of carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions in the United States per year, more than any other sector. U.S. buildings alone are
responsible for more CO2 emissions annually than those of any other country except China.
Most of these emissions come from the combustion of fossil fuels to provide heating, cooling
and lighting, and to power appliances and electrical equipment. By transforming the built
environment to be more energy-efficient and climate-friendly, the building sector can play a
major role in reducing the threat of climate change.
LEED Facts, U.S. Green Building Council (Aug. 07, 2013), https://www.usgbc.org/articles/
leed-facts.
Miami Beach, FL, Code of Ordinances §133-6(a) (2016).
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ies, where real estate has become increasingly valuable, incentivized shifts
toward LEED efficiency. Now that’s the kind of collective action that could
start to make a real dent in climate conditions.
Delivering water to municipal customers is also an energy-intensive enterprise, so any reduction in water consumption promises a corresponding
reduction in energy consumption,78 in addition to the critical environmental
benefits of conserving water for its own sake. Because one-third of all household water use in the United States is for nonagricultural landscaping,79 the
SDC recommends landscaping for water conservation and xeriscaping, or
the replacement of non-native plant species (like water-loving grasses) with
native species adapted for local climatic conditions.80 Localities can implement sustainable landscaping goals not only by educating residents about
the importance of water conservation (and the resulting financial benefits to
them personally),81 but by requiring developers to submit landscaping plans
as part of development applications.82 EPA estimates that 8.5 billion gallons
of water are used for nonagricultural outdoor purposes on a daily basis.83 If
communities could halve that figure through native landscaping and xeriscaping, Americans could save 4.25 billion gallons of water per day, or 1.551
trillion gallons of water per year in the United States84 —roughly equivalent
to the amount of water used by 17 million homes annually, and 50% greater
than the amount of water wasted every year through household water leaks.85
78.
79.

80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

U.S. EPA, Energy Efficiency in Water and Wastewater Facilities 1 (2013), https://perma.cc/
PWQ4-MND4.
U.S. EPA, How We Use Water, https://www.epa.gov/watersense/how-we-use-water (last visited May
14, 2019):
Nationally, outdoor water use accounts for 30 percent of household use yet can be much
higher in drier parts of the country and in more water-intensive landscapes. For example,
the arid West has some of the highest per capita residential water use because of landscape
irrigation.
Water Conservation, Sustainable Development Code, http://sustainablecitycode.org/brief/requirewater-efficient-landscaping-2/#_edn1 (last visited Apr. 23, 2019). Energy Conservation and Efficiency,
Sustainable Development Code, https://sustainablecitycode.org/brief/require-water-efficientlandscaping-5/.
See Avi Friedman, Fundamentals of Sustainable Dwellings, 199-200 (2012); Sarah B. Schindler,
Banning Lawns, 82 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 394, 408 (2014).
See, e.g., Fort Lauderdale, Fla., Unified Land Development Code § 47-39.A.13 (C) (2009). Fort
Lauderdale’s code also requires that the applications include plans for using native species, diversifying
the kind of species planted, and implementing xeriscaping.
U.S. EPA, Water-Smart Landscapes 2 (July 2013), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2017-01/documents/ws-outdoor-water-efficient-landscaping.pdf (estimating that 29 billion
gallons of water are used daily in the United States and therefore 8.5 billion accounts for 30 percent).
Statistics calculated by dividing 8.5 billion in half and then multiplying it by 365 days to equal the
yearly totals.
Chris Mooney, The Incredibly Stupid Way That Americans Waste 1 Trillion Gallons of Water Each Year,
Wash. Post, Mar. 17, 2015.
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Imagine—what if the same households also fixed the dripping faucets in
their homes, a far easier task than water conservation landscaping?
It is good to be able to envision scaling up the local environmental progress
already happening around the country, but of course, accomplishing these
results through piecemeal regional governance will not be easy. Achieving
the ambitious emission reduction goals set out in the 2015 Paris Agreement86
will be an especially difficult task for local governments acting without the
support of a uniform national program. Yet under the current political circumstances, it may be the only way that Americans can join the global community in the massive undertaking needed to prevent the worst impacts of
climate change. As noted in part I, the State Climate Alliance coalition of
25 states and territories has already committed to upholding the objectives of
the Paris Agreement within their borders,87 signaling that resolve. Uniform
laws and model rules, including the broad adoption of researched proposals
in the new SDC, may provide the means for state and local actors to scale
up to a uniform national response without the benefit of federal authority.

B.

Coordinated Action Through Private Environmental Governance

Uniform laws provide the most obvious model for coordinated but nonfederal national response, yet we might even consider less conventional means.
Legal pluralism heralds the possibility of multiple sources of normative policymaking operating simultaneously, including sources that go beyond the
sovereignty-based law of nations, states, or local governments.88 Could private or non-governmental policymaking contribute to large-scale environmental action?
In the herculean effort to achieve national-level results without the tools
of national authority, it is worth considering the supporting role that private
governance could play.89 Perhaps there is a role for meaningful environmental
guidance or rulemaking by professional associations like the American Law
86.

87.
88.
89.

Earth Institute, What Is the U.S. Commitment in Paris? State of the Planet (Dec. 11, 2015) https://
blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2015/12/11/what-is-the-u-s-commitment-in-paris/:
The United States has committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28 percent
below the 2005 level in 2025, and to make “best efforts” to reduce emissions by 28 percent.
That would include curbs on carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbons,
sulfur hexafluoride and nitrogen trifluoride, all of which contribute to global warming.
U.S. Climate Alliance, https://www.usclimatealliance.org (last visited May 14, 2019).
Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155 (2007); Erin Ryan, Federalism
as Legal Pluralism, in The Oxford Handbook on Legal Pluralism (Paul Berman ed., 2019).
Michael P. Vandenberg, Reconceptualizing the Future of Environmental Law: The Role of Private Climate
Governance, 31 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 382 (2015); Michael P. Vandenberg, Private Environmental
Governance, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 129 (2013).
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Institute, the American Bar Association, or the American Medical Association, all of whom share interests in managing public health and safety. Commercial associations could become involved, such as the Risk and Insurance
Management Society, which advises risk management professionals throughout the world and whose members would share an interest in moderating the
accelerating environmental risks associated with climate change.
Trade organizations like the National Association of Tax Professionals,
arts and culture organizations like the Screen Actors Guild, nongovernmental legal institutions like the Council of Mayors, colleges and universities,
athletic teams and their fans, and others could all play a role. International
service organizations like the Rotary Club could engage local business and
community leaders to act as ambassadors for a chosen strategy to their distinct social networks. Religious environmental organizations have been
especially proliferating in recent years, including the interdenominational
National Religious Partnership for the Environment, providing environmental inspiration, education, and leadership within different communities of
faith.90
Organizations like these could adopt a an SDC, either a general program
or a subset of rules tailored to their own specialty. They could disseminate it
among their own members, who could role model their behavior within their
own professional networks and personal communities. Disseminating norms
this way could begin the process of meaningfully shifting cultural norms
involving waste, transportation, or energy use from the bottom up, where it
may stick even more effectively than norm transitions that come only from
the top down.
This section closes with a concrete example that ties some of the ideas in
this chapter together: the large-scale deployment of consistent sustainability protocols through collectively organized but privately acting homeowner
associations.

C.

Sustainable CC&Rs as Climate Policy

Of all the large-scale environmental challenges we face, climate change is
the grandest, ideally calling not only for national but also for international
90.

National Religious Partnership for the Environment, http://www.nrpe.org (last visited May
14, 2019):
The National Religious Partnership for the Environment brings together a diverse alliance
of faith institutions and leaders in order to bring voice and action on behalf of caring for
God’s Creation. NRPE offers resources and accounts of how people of faith are acting upon
God’s mandate to be stewards of God’s Earth. NRPE also fosters the religious voice on
environmental issues.
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policymaking. Yet a substantial volume of climate-relevant decisionmaking occurs within individual homes and neighborhoods. And in the United
States, a large volume amount of that decisionmaking takes place through
private homeowner associations (HOA)s.
HOAs create responsibilities and restrict choices among residents through
the private law tools of restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes, generally through formal conditions, covenants, and restrictions (CC&Rs). One
in five Americans lives on property subject to HOA governance,91 but many
HOAs operate without sufficient legal expertise or guidance. Recognizing
this problem, many states enact statutes92; many municipalities provide guidance93; and many private organizations sponsor training materials94 for HOA
board members, to help them make better decisions that strengthen their
communities. But what if they could get additional guidance about making
good environmental choices?
In other words, if we cannot get national-level climate policy through the
federal government, and we cannot get enough states or cities on board to
do the entire job at the regional level, maybe we could bridge the remaining
gap to implement effective national-scale policy by harnessing the private law
influence of HOA decisionmaking. Borrowing from the insights of the Sustainable Development Code discussed above,95 experts could draft a Model
HOA Sustainability Code of best practices that address such climate-related
topics as water use, recycling, energy conservation, renewables, transportation design, and other issues that implicate climate footprint. A Model HOA
Sustainability Code could encourage landscaping practices that are consistent with water conservation and that limit pesticide and nutrient loading of
waterways. It could provide guidance for increasing recycling and composting, mandate LEED-certified construction and Energy Star Appliances, and
incentivize the use of hybrid or electric vehicles.
A Model HOA Sustainability Code could also discourage HOAs from
preventing solar panels, clothes lines, rain barrels, compost bins, or other
sustainable practices that some HOAs have previously forbidden for aesthetic
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Ernie Smith, Study: Homeowners Associations Hit New Population Peaks, Assocs. Now (May 15, 2015),
https://associationsnow.com/2015/05/study-homeowners-associations-hit-new-population-peaks/.
Fla. Stat. §720 (2018).
Homeowners Associations, Henrico County, Virginia, https://henrico.us/revit/hoas/ (last visited
May 14, 2019).
Homeowner Associations USA, A Guide for Homeowner Association Board Members (2010), https://
www.hoa-usa.com/files/documents/Board%20Training%20Curriculum%20102013.pdf.
Climate Change, Sustainable Development Code, http://sustainablecitycode.org/chapter/
chapter-1/1-1/#intro (last visited May 15, 2019).
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reasons.96 Not all HOAs impose aesthetic guidelines, nor do all HOAs consider sustainable practices like installing solar panels to be unaesthetic, but
enough have taken steps to limit them that an increasing number of states
have enacted legislation preventing it.97 A Model HOA Sustainability Code
must be sensitive to the value that many HOA residents place on aesthetic
uniformity, which they see as beautifying their neighborhoods, ensuring
that all owners properly maintain their property, and preserving their overall
property values.98 Model Code proposals encouraging compost bins or rain
barrels could face opposition, but HOAs can overcome it by ensuring a strict
style of uniformity in the implementation of sustainable practices.
For example, HOAs could encourage residents to compost or line dry
clothes but require that compost bins or clotheslines be kept behind homes
or out of street view. They could encourage residents to use rain barrels, but
require a uniform size, shape, or color. They could encourage the installation of solar panels but require reasonable uniformity in placement or other
aesthetic factors, and perhaps even negotiate volume discounts for their residents with providers who can specialize their services to community aesthetic
guidelines. Implementing sustainable practices without sacrificing aesthetic
value is both possible and desirable, and helping HOAs do so through a
Model Code could helpfully shift the culture of how HOA residents engage
with sustainability.99
Following the guidance in a Model HOA Sustainability Code, HOAs
could even be encouraged to provide sanctuary for the biodiversity that is
increasingly threatened in areas undergoing rapidly residential development.
Larger HOAs often manage green spaces beyond the yards of individual
96.
97.

98.

99.

See, e.g., Stan Cox, Homeowner Associations Restrict Eco-Friendly Practices in Favor of Aesthetics, Grist
(Aug. 13, 2008), https://grist.org/article/lets-handcuff-the-property-cops/ (discussing HOA objections
to ecofriendly household practices such as clotheslines, rain barrels, and native landscaping).
See, e.g., Savannah Cardon, Bill Introduced to Keep HOAs From Banning Rooftop Solar Panels, Idaho
Press (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.idahopress.com/news/local/bill-introduced-to-keep-hoas-frombanning-rooftop-solar-panels/article_18f59738-7a2d-56c1-add8-60ffff2359aa.html; Homeowners
Associations and Solar Access in Florida, Solar United Neighbors, https://www.solarunitedneighbors.
org/florida/learn-the-issues-in-florida/homeowners-associations-and-solar-access-in-florida/ (last visited
May 14, 2019) (discussing two different Florida statutes enacted to prevent HOAs from interfering
with property owners’ installation of solar panels).
Homeowners Associations: The Pros and Cons of HOAs, UpNest, https://www.upnest.com/1/post/
homeowners-associations-the-pros-and-cons-of-hoa/ (last visited May 14, 2019); Erin A. Hopkins,
The Impact of Community Associations on Residential Property Values: A Review of the Literature 5 (Nov.
2015), https://foundation.caionline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/VATech_Property_Values.pdf
(explaining that while a number of factors contribute to fluctuations in property value, the covenants
of an HOA can protect neighbors of unkempt or foreclosed homes from decreases in property value
due to unkempt properties or lawns).
Seth Weissman, HOA Covenants for Sustainability, Urban Land Mag., Mar. 8, 2012, https://urbanland.uli.org/economy-markets-trends/hoa-covenants-for-sustainability/.
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homeowners, which, if properly managed, can become home to native plant
and animal species.100 One study even found an increase in biodiversity on
well-managed HOA grounds.101 When managed with native landscaping
and without the over application of pesticides, HOA grounds provide fertile ground for bird and wildlife habitat, which can both promote environmental values and provide increased enjoyment for residents. In these ways,
HOAs can be managed compatibly with environmental values, and they can
become a resource and a role model for encouraging sustainability within
their communities.
Conventionally, HOAs have been seen more often as protectors of private
real estate interests than as friends of the environment, but of course, we are
increasingly seeing how the two are interrelated. Imagining HOAs at the
forefront of national-level sustainable governance may require vision, but it
is hard to imagine a more pressing moment for environmental visionaries.
The call for that scale of thinking, that degree of creativity, and that reach of
ambition is here. Now is the time to try everything, because we have absolutely everything to lose.

III.

Conclusion

In the current political context, the threat of federal preemption of subnational regulation poses serious problems for environmental governance, as do
the governance-scale challenges of managing national-level environmental
crises without the benefit of federal authority. Overcoming them will require
novel ideas and ambitious plans of action. Yet it is a moment in which the
benefits of environmental federalism—and American federalism in general—are especially revealed. Preserving local, state, and regional authority
to respond to the environmental problems left unchecked at the federal level
will be key, as will be tapping the potential capacity of private environmental
governance by non-governmental actors and individuals.
As this chapter details, subnational actors are already taking up the gauntlet thrown down by the recent wave of federal environmental repeals. The
goal is not to replace federal environmental law, which will always be needed
for dealing with environmental harms that spill over into subnational jurisdictional boundaries, or that require international cooperation, or for pro100. Susannah B. Lerman, Victoria Kelly Turner, & Christofer Bang, Homeowner Associations as a Vehicle
for Promoting Native Urban Biodiversity, 17 Ecology & Soc’y 45 (2012); University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Homeowner Groups Can Support Native Species in Suburbia, ScienceDaily, Mar. 25, 2013,
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/03/130325160240.htm.
101. Homeowner Groups Can Support Native Species in Suburbia, supra note 100.
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viding certain regulatory capacity, in terms of rulemaking, financing, and
research tools of good governance. The goal is to produce enough regulatory
redundancy to withstand lapses in federal or state involvement as necessary.
As the federal government withdraws itself from the regulatory arena,
it confers an opportunity on state, local, and even private and professional
actors to experiment with the limits of their own regulatory capacity, and to
show the world what might be possible. For example, environmental advocates worldwide were shattered when the Trump Administration withdrew
the United States from the Paris Agreement,102 but a separately acting coalition of states, companies, and municipalities quickly pledged to honor the
agreement anyway, doing what they could with the capacity available to
them.103 As halting and disjointed as these efforts may seem, they represent
a hopeful harbinger for more coordinated nonfederal environmental governance in the future.
To be sure, there are limits to what local governments and private governance can do in attempting to fulfill the promises made on behalf of an
entire nation—in this case, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 26% below
2005 levels by 2025, by mandating improved appliance efficiency, higher fuel
economy in motor vehicles, and reduced emissions from power generation.104
The very collective action problems of hold-out and free-riding that inspired
the strong federal authority conferred by the U.S. Constitution105 threaten to
undo purely local efforts.106
Yet while states, cities, and even HOAs lack the power of the federal
government to, for example, reenact the Clean Power Plan that the Obama
Administration had drafted to effectuate our Paris Agreement commitment, they also have advantages that the federal government lacks. Local
actors can respond more nimbly to the needs of individual communities
when implementing emission reducing actions,107 especially in the context
of energy reform. Local governments can play an enormously important role
in creating transportation options and fostering local, renewable, energy pro102. Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. Fom Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html.
103. Tabuchi & Fountain, supra note 27.
104. United States of America, NDC Registry (interim) (last visited May 14, 2019). https://www4.unfccc.
int/sites/NDCStaging/pages/Party.aspx?party=USA
105. Alison L. Lacroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism 135-48 (2010).
106. See Robert B. McKinstry et al., Federal Climate Change Legislation As If the States Matter, 22 Nat.
Resources & Env’t 3, (2008); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is
Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About
Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 Urb. Law. 1015 (2006).
107. ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability, Localizing the Paris Agreement (2017), http://icleiusa.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Localizing-the-Paris-Agreement-ICLEI-USA-2017.pdf
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duction.108 In areas where local production is not possible, municipalities
can negotiate with investor-owned utilities to provide renewable energy that
align with their community goals.
As the Sustainable Development Code demonstrates, both public and private actors can encourage developers to build more energy-efficient buildings, through both tax incentives and private demand. Waste management,
an energy-intensive endeavor, is another realm in which local actors can
cumulatively facilitate national emissions reductions. By setting waste diversion and reduction goals, local governments can encourage citizens to locally
recycle, compost, and produce less waste than they do today, saving the
energy otherwise required to collect, transport, and process it.109 Encouraging citizens to produce less waste will require cultural shifts over time, but
local governments can accelerate the process by charging a fee for single-use
grocery bags or building local compost facilities to reduce methane emissions
from food waste.
In the end, achieving the U.S. emission reduction goals set out in the Paris
Agreement will be a difficult task for subnational actors, but until environmental advocates regain federal authority, it is their best—and perhaps our
only—alternative. Joining forces with the rest of the global community to
combat climate change will require creativity and experimentation. It will
not be easy for Americans, but we can follow multiple pathways toward better
energy consumption, water usage, emissions reduction, and waste management, organizing through the media of uniform laws, model sustainability
codes, or private law alternatives organized through, to take one example,
HOA-based private governance.
The ideas and examples offered here are just the beginnings of the brainstorm of how state, local, private, and professional actors can aggregate environmental reform across communities. But as noted above, necessity breeds
creativity—and right now, the need is humbling. If trends continue, a return
to laissez-faire, pre-environmental movement policies looms just as the
unabated climate crisis portends new levels of environmental catastrophe. So
with alarm bells for inspiration, environmental advocates must work together
as never before to find a path forward.

108. Id.
109. See sources cited supra note 67.
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